
The Millennium Development Goals and Fragile States: Focusing on What Really Matters

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Summit to evaluate progress made toward the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ended in New York on September 22, 2010. The outcome document—“Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals”¹—is yet another call to action so that the MDGs can be achieved by their 2015 target date. The authors of the document argue that the MDGs can still be attained if donor countries scale up their efforts and financial commitments and improve the way they deliver aid.

Regardless of the fact that there are measurement issues and a lack of reliable data for several MDG objectives, targets, and indicators, there is evidence of what is happening.² The main message reads something like this: there has been progress on the MDGs but it has been very uneven across regions and countries. Many of the goals will not be met but the one that the international community has been fixated on—namely, the halving of poverty—will likely be reached due to impressive growth rates in China and India over the past decade.

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The assumption behind the quantitative targets put forth in the MDGs was to ensure that past performance observed globally over the 25 years before 1990 should be improved upon over the next 25 years.³ These targets were thus not linked to what had happened at the regional or country levels. However, even if it is unreasonable to expect all countries to individually meet the MDGs, our argument is simple: lack of progress in the so-called poorest of the poor performers, or what we call fragile states, is preventing the achievement of most of the global targets. The glaring omission of fragile states from the outcome document means that the international community is not properly equipped—conceptually and politically—to improve the state of the world’s poor. As we will show below, it does not make a lot of sense, from a policy perspective, to claim that the international community is succeeding globally when many countries and/or regions excluded from the analysis are being left behind.

From a conceptual perspective, the MDGs serve as broad proxy measures for countries’ underlying economic problems relating to structural, social, and political inequalities as well as service delivery issues. For example, the MDGs related to health and education tell us about the capacity of a country to allocate resources to basic human needs, its commitment to equity, and the delivery of services. But, as we show below, given their focus on development outcomes, the MDGs do not directly target and monitor other equally important performance measures such as the legitimacy and authority of states, which tell us about the policy environment of the country. The absence of any sort of appreciation of the policy environment means that the analysis of how a country is performing is incomplete.

The implication of our argument is clear: the populations living in fragile states are further from benefiting from progress on the MDGs than

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any others on the planet. Using the indicators provided by the UN Millennium Project, it is possible to measure both the progress that each failed and fragile state must make in order to realize its portion of the MDGs, and the potential impact on global progress toward the goals should that state begin—or continue—to regress.⁴ Even where

gains have been made, there is a continuing danger: so long as stability eludes such states, small gains may be wiped out at any time by loss of authority, instability, governmental failure, or conflict.

Thus, fragile states represent an important threat to the overall MDG campaign. For example, according to Branchflower et al., among all developing nations, failed and fragile states account for 28 to 35 percent of the absolute poor; 32 to 46 percent of children that do not receive a primary education; 41 to 51 percent of children that die before their 5th birthday; 33 to 44 percent of maternal deaths; 34 to 44 percent of those living with HIV/AIDS; and 27 to 35 percent of those lacking safe drinking water.⁵ We believe that progress on the MDGs constitutes a fair test of the effectiveness of aid programs.⁶ If progress at an individual country level is not being made especially among the most fragile states, then this would suggest we need to rethink how the international community engages these countries.

Unfortunately, the UN's strategy regarding MDGs does not address the specific problems of failed and fragile states. The UN appears committed to a long list of steps that need to be taken in order to reach the MDGs by the target date, including important commitments for women's and children's health and several other initiatives to continue the fight against poverty, hunger, and disease. Although reference is made to the special characteristics and uniqueness of landlocked countries and the Small-Island Developing States, as well as the challenges facing Africa and the lesser-developed countries, there is no coherent overall strategy for the group of countries considered fragile.

This is surprising given all the resources that have been devoted to understanding and responding to the challenges posed by fragile states in the past decade. Indeed, according to a 2005 French government report, a fragile state is assessed in negative terms, using poor economic performance and the effective impotence of government as the two main criteria for defining such a state.⁷ State fragility could thus be measured by using progress on attaining the MDGs as a point of reference but, as we argue below, some effort must be made to focus on other aspects of a state's development, such as authority and legitimacy structures. A degree of flexibility is needed in the UN targets such that the rule of law, control over the country's territory, and respect for minorities, as well as the delivery of basic services, could be included as targets. In brief, unless donors start thinking more coherently about reaching targets in fragile states, the outcome of the next important rendezvous to take stock of what has been accomplished in five years may prove to be quite disappointing.

CURRENT THINKING

Fortunately, there is sufficient research on state fragility that such stock-taking may ultimately prove fruitful. A fragile state is one with a

poor policy environment; it is not necessarily a country beset by open, large-scale violence or illegitimate government, although both may be present.⁸ Different organizations have identified anywhere between 30 to 50 such states. For example, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which is a subsidiary body of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), uses a compilation of three lists—specifically, the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2008, the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World of 2009, and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 2008 index—and comes up with 43 fragile states, a large number of which are located in sub-Saharan Africa.⁹

Two basic policies have come to dominate responses to state fragility and failure, each driven by different motivations and resulting in distinct policy recommendations. The first, typified by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. National Security Strategy, begins with the assumption that fragile and failed states are a threat to national security and the international order.¹⁰ The second approach, grounded in the development literature, is mostly concerned with the significant challenge that fragile and failed states pose to poverty alleviation and achievement of the MDGs.¹¹ Examples of this second approach include the OECD Learning Advisory Process (LAP) on Difficult Partnerships and the *Fragile State Strategy* released by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID).¹²

The UK and US approaches are driven by divergent imperatives and, consequently, arrive at different policy prescriptions. Failed and fragile state policies concerned with security encourage approaches that provide immediate stability, such as strengthening military and police forces, limiting opportunities for international terrorist activities, and suppressing transnational crime. Policies most concerned with achieving the MDGs focus on programming that enhances opportunities for education and employment, reduces disease and malnutrition, increases standards of living, and supports concepts such as “good-enough” governance.¹³

At best, these two dominant approaches result in policy frameworks that are only partially complementary. Their contrasting definitions of fragile and failed states generate different lists of at-risk countries and prescribe different policies for the future. Clearly, they require close coordination to ensure that the pursuit of one does not undermine the efforts of the other.¹⁴ Efforts to synthesize the two approaches have thus far made only limited progress; most have been marked by a reluctance to cross

departmental boundaries. For example, the recent document, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, produced as part of the OECD LAP,¹⁵ acknowledges that a secure environment is a necessary prerequisite of effective aid, but the document gives very little indication of how this might be achieved.

Although the LAP has made considerable progress toward harmonizing and aligning donor agency actions in failed state environments, there is no similar process in place to enhance coordination between development agencies and security forces operating in the same theater. All such efforts are left to individual donor governments, with inconsistent results.¹⁶

There are, of course, a number of other important concerns emanating from fragile and failed state environments. Though not always included in the literature on fragile states, the report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, drafted by the UN's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, offered perhaps the most complete justification for international engagement in fragile states. In its account of the most pressing threats to national and international security, the panel goes beyond traditional concerns of interstate conflict and includes economic and social threats, including "poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime."¹⁷ All of these threats are likely to emerge in fragile and failed states. As such, any truly comprehensive strategy must account for all of them. Though many nations' policies mention these and other important considerations in failing and failed state environments, few specify how such factors can be systematically incorporated into analysis of and policy relating to fragile states. This is a challenge that we have taken up in our research over the past few years.

STATE FRAGILITY: THEORY AND POLICY

In our conceptualization and empirical research, a state needs to display the three fundamental properties of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (ALC) to function properly.¹⁸ We characterize fragility as a relative concept so that all states are thus, to some extent, fragile. In that sense we need to consider not only the extreme cases of failing, failed, and collapsed states, but also those that have the potential to fail. Authority measures the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding legislation over its population, to exercise coercive force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide a stable and secure environment

to its citizens and communities. Legitimacy describes the extent to which a particular government commands public loyalty to the governing regime

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and generates domestic support for its legislation and policy. Capacity refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources toward productive ends.

This ALC approach is thus a synthesis of three theoretical streams: development (as measured through indicators of capacity such as GDP


per capita and foreign aid), conflict (as measured through indicators of authority such as the level of corruption and contract regulation), and security (as measured by indicators of legitimacy such as regime type and human rights). In addition to these ALC composite indices and an overall fragility index, indicator clusters along several dimensions (governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and the environment) are also used for each country.

As argued above, responses to state fragility and failure have been driven by different factors and have yielded different policy responses. As a result, the rankings that are produced by various organizations can be quite different because they tend to emphasize varying aspects of fragility. However, despite differing opinions on their precise classification, there is no question about the policy relevance of these fragile states for several reasons.

First, fragile states are by definition characterized by weak policy environments that tend to persist over time. In fact, in our CIFP rankings,¹⁹ more than half of the forty most fragile states in 1980 were still on that list in 2007. In other words, progress is possible but any engagement is a long-term challenge that is further complicated by the multifaceted nature and structural complexity of fragility, making policy entry difficult.

Second, turning a blind eye to fragile states can be extremely costly in terms of poverty and well-being, as well as for neighboring countries and the international community. Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler estimate the total cost of failing states to be around USD 276 billion per year, and 80 percent of the cost is inflicted on neighboring countries as a result of the externalities that they impose on others.²⁰

Figure 1: Growth Comparisons



Source: Constructed with data from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

To highlight the enormity of the challenge, in Figure 1 we compare the average per capita growth rates of these fragile states with the low-income and lower middle-income countries based on the official World Bank classification of countries (which are helpful, as they include most of the fragile states themselves). Over the 1990 to 2008 period, USD 470 billion in net official development assistance (ODA) was allocated to fragile states, and in most years, per capita growth rates were lower on average than in the low-income and lower middle-income countries. This is particularly disconcerting since successful development strategies that translate into higher growth rates can inhibit fragility.

As another reminder of what state fragility can do, consider the cases of Haiti and Pakistan, which have been consistently ranked among the most fragile states for decades and made headlines this year as both were

hit by natural disasters. Despite massive amounts of aid being poured into these two countries by the international community over the years, they lack the capacity to respond to even the most basic needs of their populations in times of crisis.

Haiti has received close to USD 9 billion in foreign aid over the period 1960 to 2008. Before the earthquake hit, the country was ranked 149th out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index, with 72 percent of its population living on less than USD 2 a day, and 42 percent of its population not using an improved water source.²¹ Its GDP per capita in 2008 of USD 1,087 was roughly half of what it was in 1980, and life expectancy is at 61 years according to World Bank data. Transparency International ranks Haiti 146 out of 178 countries in its 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.²²


In Pakistan, poverty remains a growing problem even though growth rates in per-capita terms have averaged nearly 2 percent since the 1990s; 60 percent of the population lives on less than USD 2 a day, and 23 percent on less than USD 1.25 a day. The country is ranked in the medium human development category, only a few ranks above countries such as Angola, Madagascar, and Haiti.²³ It faces a range of development challenges in the areas of education, health, and respect for human rights despite receiving more than USD 44 billion in foreign aid since 1960 (our calculations use World Bank data). Pakistan will most likely not meet its MDGs in primary education, gender equality, or child and maternal mortality.

A recent article in *The New York Times* reported that less than 2 percent of Pakistan's population pays income tax, so the country's revenue from taxes is one of the lowest in the world.²⁴ The absence of an efficient and uncorrupt tax system means that the rich (who include the politicians that make rules about taxes) are largely untaxed, thus preventing any meaningful redistribution of income or creation of a fiscal pact where government has to be accountable to its taxpayers. But why tax and be accountable when aid, despite its volatility, keeps flowing in year after year? In both cases, the authorities spent most of their time after the disasters that hit their respective nations asking for donations from wealthier countries and were largely ineffective in aiding victims on the ground.

Taken together, the forty-three fragile states listed by INCAF account for close to one billion inhabitants, or roughly 15 percent of the world's population. If current trends persist, none of these countries will meet any of the MDGs by 2015, even though a considerable amount of resources have gone to them in the past two decades (see Figure 2 below for aid as a percentage of these countries' national incomes). In 2008, net ODA to these forty-three fragile states amounted to more than USD 41 billion.

However, this number can be quite misleading as the top five recipients of ODA (namely Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, West Bank and Gaza, and Sudan) make up more than half of the total aid allocated even though they represent only about 20 percent of the population living in fragile states.²⁵

Figure 2: Aid to Fragile States, 1990–2008



Source: Constructed with data from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Not only is aid highly concentrated in these countries (indicating the presence of “aid darlings” and “aid orphans”), but it also tends to be extremely volatile, further undermining its effectiveness. More importantly, aid can in some cases be much higher than what the countries can absorb, thus creating the real possibility of diminishing returns to investments. Several studies that have tested for nonlinearity in the aid-growth relationship find that negative returns tend to occur when aid reaches anywhere between 15 and 45 percent of a country’s GDP.²⁶ Although this is a wide range, many of the fragile states are already within that range or above it, pointing to the need for donors to work more carefully with these recipients as efforts are made to ramp up aid flows to achieve the MDGs.²⁷

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In our own work, we have found that countries tend to become fragile and fail for different reasons, which again speaks to the multifaceted nature of the problem. For example, when we examine countries in terms of ALC or indicator clusters, we find that although some states are weak along virtually all dimensions, the situation is more complex for most of them—they often demonstrate elements of stability in some aspects and fragility in others. Such a finding, together with the fact that fragility is persistent (as indicated above), highlights the need for country-specific approaches for policy makers and the need for continuous assessment and monitoring.

In Appendix A, we have included several countries along with their CIFP fragility scores and rankings based on the latest data for 2007, followed by the likelihood that they will meet the MDGs. Not surprisingly, extremely fragile countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti are not on track to meet any of the goals. Zimbabwe, which is ranked 32nd on the list of fragile states, is also not on target. In our current work, we have found that rapid changes in authority structures tend to be key drivers of instability in the most fragile countries, and that such changes are independent of poor capacity structures. This indicates the need for a multipronged approach that targets individual weaknesses with separate instruments, as opposed to focusing on security and hoping that development will follow. On the other hand, in cases where fragility is not extreme, targeting certain areas may create positive feedbacks for other vulnerable areas.

THE WAY FORWARD:

THE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF ENGAGEMENTS

The policy community might be best served by thinking of fragile-state analysis as a mechanism for the monitoring of long-term processes, both structural and dynamic, in which conflict is but one of many features of fragility. Simply put, policies regarding failed and fragile states are often not informed by shared, regular, broad-based situation analyses. Where analysis is factored into programming, it is often a one-off, in-house exercise that is not shared across departments or between governments and agencies. Given the dynamic and complex nature of fragility, appropriate and sustainable action will require systematic and regular monitoring, analysis, and structural risk assessments.

Furthermore, and related to the lack of analysis-driven programming, the impact of engaging in a fragile state is often reduced or misunderstood due to a lack of coordination and a coherent strategy. Frequently,

key actors—NGOs, governments, multilateral organizations, civil society-groups, etc.—operate in isolation or do not coordinate activities across sectors.²⁸ This isolation and absence of coordination often results from a lack of common analysis and multi-agency planning forums for the development of joint strategies.²⁹ The fundamental challenges for any analysis of fragile and failed states include long-term and short-term planning, as well as developing impact-assessment capabilities, and integrating these into government structures at the highest levels.³⁰

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Potential drawbacks of engagement must be carefully weighed against anticipated opportunities arising from action. In Table 1 below, we identify several potential risks and opportunities associated with engagement in fragile states. Activities are divided into five issue-areas of impact: political, economic, security, development, and structural. It is widely recognized that prevention is much preferred to reconstruction. Yet effective engagements to stabilize fragile states require political will, sufficient resource commitments, and clear mandates.³¹

Table 1: Risks and Opportunities of Intervention in Fragile States³²

Issue Area	Risks	Opportunities
Political	Stabilizing activities may be perceived as reinforcing illegitimate political structures	Stabilizing activities may strengthen existing formal and informal political structures
	Justifying resource allocation to stabilize a fragile state may be difficult to defend post facto, in absence of a counterfactual	Opportunities for effective leadership may be seized in the context of hesitation by the international community
	External actions may worsen the situation in a fragile state (e.g., by promoting majoritarian elections in a highly divided society)	Interventions may establish or restore rule of law and political institutions
	Political and domestic will in the intervening country may be weak if the intervention entails high risk	The existence of a substantial diaspora population could support/legitimize intervention

Issue Area	Risks	Opportunities
Economic	Costs of intervention may be greater than anticipated	Costs of successful preventative intervention are much lower than costs of “bringing back” a failed state
	Aid and personnel commitments may be misspent in the context of a poorly planned or unsuccessful operation	Donors can help fragile states restore economic growth, achieve financial stabilization, and begin reconstruction and development
	Potentially harmful impact of development aid if stolen or diverted	Potential for development aid to curb or prevent humanitarian disaster, including potential spill-over effects
Security	Local contingents may be hostile to external intervention	Local organizations may be committed to creating stability by working cooperatively
	External intervention could exacerbate tensions within local groups	Role as a third-party mediator in reconciliatory negotiation
	Training and education of police and military forces may be met with resistance and accusations of imposing foreign practices/values	Enhance security by improving professionalism and effectiveness of military and police forces
	External presence may elevate feelings of fear and hostility among local population	Slow down or prevent destabilizing migratory population flows
Development	External presence may undermine local capacities and indigenous group processes and/or practices	Successful missions will help to foster social cohesion and strengthen civil society networks
	Personnel may be put at risk if engaged in environments characterized by disease, human rights abuses, and violent conflict	Stabilization can contribute to human security, leadership capacity, and basic service delivery in the fragile state
Structural	Stabilizing missions may be too short-term, aiming for a “quick fix” instead of long-term commitments	Opportunities for innovation in timely, committed, successful intervention; could impart valuable lessons learned
	Foreign presence may feed feelings of resentment and undermine local ownership	External commitment may help foster closer ties and mutual trust between communities and nations

There are a number of very serious risks associated with external engagement in a fragile state, which must be carefully weighed against the potential benefits. For example, development aid can have negative effects on fragile states, such as subsidizing war economies, undermining local revenue capacity, or encouraging unsustainable uses of natural resources.

Local actors may be suspicious, resentful, or even openly hostile to external intervention in general. Such negative attitudes may be motivated by an impression of the imposition of foreign values or practices upon local communities, which may undermine indigenous processes. Additionally, some engagements in fragile states may pose great risks to foreign personnel involved, particularly in environments of disease, criminal activity, corruption, and human rights abuses, coupled with lackluster or nonexistent law enforcement capacity. Ultimately, if success is not clearly defined or if the specific external contributions are not made explicitly clear, intervention may be difficult to justify to voting constituents in the absence of a counterfactual (“what would have happened if we had not acted?”). These are just a few of the risks that must be carefully considered.

There is also a great deal of room for aid agencies to be pioneers in this arena, with the possibility of engagement ensuring successful prevention based on best practices and sharing valuable lessons learned by the international community. There are a number of very positive contributions that engaging a fragile state can have, only a handful of which have been listed. Some may help foster social cohesion by building informal networks and voluntary associations, including ones that assist in the reintegration of soldiers into society.³³ They can help bring stability to a fragile state by encouraging reconciliatory talks, preventing spillover effects of humanitarian crises, or helping to establish law and order.

CONCLUSION

The evidence we have gathered in pursuit of a more concrete and effective approach to state fragility is driven in part by a new understanding of the world in which all countries must learn how to survive. The evidence suggests that we must be forward-looking and be prepared to act preventively.

If the first two decades following the end of the Cold War clearly demonstrated that robust military interventions were essential to dealing with the most egregious cases of state failure, then the next decade is surely our opportunity to move from this reactive stance to a preventive one. As we begin to better understand why and how states fail, we know that the onset of conflict and armed violence is but a late-stage symptom in a larger set of deeper underlying structural processes. And it is on those processes that we must focus our attention.

There is a pressing need for policymakers from all countries to engage in serious discussion about the future of the most fragile states in the world and, more importantly, how to engage them if we want to have a realistic

chance of making progress toward the MDGs in these countries and globally. Just as considerable resources are continuously invested in fixing failed and collapsed states, so too is there an ongoing belief that such policies are sufficient and appropriate. Given what we now know about fragile states and the costs associated with fixing them, this is a policy that is unsustainable. ■

Appendix: MDG Likelihood of Attainment and CIFP Ranking³⁴

SUDAN (6.79 - 1ST)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality	<i>low</i>			
Child Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

AFGHANISTAN (6.69 - 3RD)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger				<i>N/A</i>
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality	<i>low</i>			
Child Mortality				<i>N/A</i>
Maternal Mortality				<i>N/A</i>
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (6.50 - 6TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger	<i>low</i>			
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality	<i>low</i>			
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

HAITI (6.45 - 8TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger	<i>low</i>			
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality	<i>low</i>			
Child Mortality	<i>low</i>			
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (6.35 - 12TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger	<i>low</i>			
Education			<i>high</i>	
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
Maternal Mortality				<i>N/A</i>
HIV/AIDS and Malaria				<i>N/A</i>
Environmental Sustainability	<i>low</i>			

PAKISTAN (6.18 - 18TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality	<i>low</i>			
Child Mortality	<i>low</i>			
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria				<i>N/A</i>
Environmental Sustainability			<i>high</i>	

UGANDA (6.11 - 24TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education			<i>high</i>	
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality	<i>low</i>			
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria			<i>high</i>	
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

ZIMBABWE (5.92 - 32ND)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger	<i>low</i>			
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality	<i>low</i>			
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability	<i>low</i>			

INDONESIA (5.46 - 58TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education		<i>medium</i>		
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality			<i>high</i>	
Maternal Mortality	<i>low</i>			
HIV/AIDS and Malaria			<i>high</i>	
Environmental Sustainability	<i>low</i>			

NICARAGUA (5.36 - 67TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality			<i>high</i>	
Maternal Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

COLOMBIA (5.24 - 77TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger			<i>high</i>	
Education	<i>low</i>			
Gender Equality		<i>medium</i>		
Child Mortality			<i>high</i>	
Maternal Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
HIV/AIDS and Malaria		<i>medium</i>		
Environmental Sustainability			<i>high</i>	

BOLIVIA (5.13 - 82ND)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger			<i>high</i>	
Education			<i>high</i>	
Gender Equality			<i>high</i>	
Child Mortality			<i>high</i>	
Maternal Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
HIV/AIDS and Malaria				<i>N/A</i>
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

PHILIPPINES (5.10 - 87TH)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger		<i>medium</i>		
Education		<i>medium</i>		
Gender Equality			<i>high</i>	
Child Mortality			<i>high</i>	
Maternal Mortality		<i>medium</i>		
HIV/AIDS and Malaria			<i>high</i>	
Environmental Sustainability		<i>medium</i>		

ENDNOTES

- 1 *Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, United Nations General Assembly Document A/65/L.1, September 17, 2010.
- 2 See <<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org>> for a complete description of these different objectives, targets, and indicators.
- 3 See Hamid Tabatabai, “MDG Targets: Misunderstood or Misconceived?” International Poverty Centre, One Pager 33 (April 2007).
- 4 Though there are some concerns with the availability of reliable data, some guidance is provided regarding methods to circumvent such problems in Andrew Branchflower et al., *How Important Are Difficult Environments to Achieving the MDGs? Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Working Paper 2* (UK Department for International Development), September 2004, 28–33.
- 5 Branchflower et al.
- 6 See Steven Radelet, *Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals*, Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 39, April 2004.
- 7 Jean-Marc Châtaigner and François Gaulme, *Beyond the Fragile State: Taking Action to Assist Fragile Actors and Societies*, Agence Française de Développement Working Paper Number 4, November 2005.
- 8 See *Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind: Summary Report*, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), February 2010.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 *Fragile States Strategy*, USAID Report PD-ACA-999, January 2005, <www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2010).
- 11 *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/55/2, September 18, 2000, <<http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf>> (accessed November 28, 2010).
- 12 *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, OECD DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships High Level Meeting, March 3, 2005, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2005); *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*, DFID, January 2005, <http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_11.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2010).
- 13 DFID, “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States,” 2005, <www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf> (accessed March 7, 2006).
- 14 To cite just one example, efforts to suppress terrorism and crime in Afghanistan included campaigns to eradicate poppy, thereby removing a source of income for transnational criminals and terrorists alike. Unfortunately, poppy also provided much of the income for Afghans in the poorest parts of the country. The UN’s *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004* estimates that the opium economy is worth 60 percent of the nation’s total licit GDP, making opium production the dominant engine of growth in the country. Clearly, this is a complicated issue, in which efforts to combat drug

- production will inevitably have drastic consequences for economic development over a significant area of the country. See *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004*, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), November 2004, <http://www.unodc.org:80/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2010).
- 15 *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, OECD Development Assistance Committee's High Level Forum, April 3-4, 2007, <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>> (accessed November 28, 2010).
 - 16 *Fragile States Strategy*, USAID. Tellingly, the first footnote in the *Fragile States Strategy* refers to U.S. National Security Strategy. The document also draws on another USAID report, entitled *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, which stresses the need for aid to align with American national strategic priorities. See *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, USAID Task Force Report, 2002, <www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2010).
 - 17 *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, UN General Assembly document A59/565, December 2, 2004, 11, <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>> (accessed October November 29, 2010).
 - 18 For a full description of the methodology, See David Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, *Security, Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 76-113.
 - 19 *Failed and Fragile States Country Ranking Table 2007*, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) report, 2007, <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_ranking.php> (accessed November 29, 2010).
 - 20 Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, *The Cost of Failing States and the Limits to Sovereignty*, United Nations University-World Institute for Development and Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Research Paper No. 2007/30, May 2007.
 - 21 *Human Development Report*, UNDP, 2009.
 - 22 *Corruption Perceptions Index 2010*, Transparency International, 2010, <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results> (accessed November 24, 2010).
 - 23 Ibid.
 - 24 Sabrina Tavernise, "Pakistan's Elite Pay Few Taxes, Widening Gap," *New York Times*, July 18, 2010.
 - 25 The numbers that we use in our calculations include debt relief, which can be large for some of these countries. However, we include them to be consistent with the DAC definition of ODA.
 - 26 For a survey of this literature, see M. McGillivray, *Is Aid Effective?* (unpublished paper), UNU-WIDER, 2004, <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/39/34353462.pdf>> (accessed December 7, 2010).
 - 27 Since fragile states are, by definition, characterized by weak institutions and policies, the saturation point is probably lower for those that are extremely fragile when compared to other countries.
 - 28 Even in fragile states, international engagement with the involvement of a committed local population will always be necessary.
 - 29 The privileging of crisis management and preventive diplomacy strategies at the expense of developing long-term, country-specific planning occurs because the latter requires financial commitment under political and economic uncertainty, non-myopic bureaucratic structures, and an extremely high degree of policy coherence.

- 30 To that end, it would be unwise to conflate prevention with crisis management and preventive diplomacy, and to assess all of these in the context of large-scale violence as opposed to state fragility or failure. By the time a conflict reaches the stages of crisis or civil war, understanding root causes matters little and the operational responses are fairly straightforward (though not easy). On the other hand, if we consider long-term prevention as a distinct construct with its own logic, then the analytical and policy challenges are much more involved and require an understanding of both risk and complexity. This is not to say that crisis management or preventive diplomacy are easy, just that they are different and should be treated as such.
- 31 Robert Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 31.
- 32 Adapted from Manuela Leonhardt, "Improving Capacities and Procedures for Formulating and Implementing Effective Conflict Prevention Strategies: An Overview of Recent Donor Initiatives," in Lund and Rasameolina, eds., *The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), 103.
- 33 Ibid, 34.
- 34 The data for these countries is drawn from various Failed and Fragile States reports and briefs, CIFP, <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_reports.php>.