What Does the Riyadh Agreement Mean for the War in Yemen?
By Nabeel Khoury
The Riyadh Agreement, signed on November 5 between the internationally-recognized Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is certainly part of the overall puzzle that is the ongoing war in Yemen. Theoretically, it could be a step towards ending this tragic war. It is not in and of itself, however, a sign that the war is ending anytime soon.
The agreement, at least on paper, unites the disparate forces that have been in control of the south of Yemen. Along with mercenaries, a portion of the national army loyal to President Abdu Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and sundry extremist militias, these forces form an anti-Houthi coalition thus far too unruly to be an effective fighting force. A political unification in the south is a necessary condition to successful peace talks with the north. It is not, however, a sufficient cause for optimism and could in fact be just another building block in preparation for a more effective assault on Houthi-controlled Sanaa.
Major points in the Riyadh Agreement include a unity government between the STC and the Hadi government to put an end to the feuding and the battle for Aden, which took place last August. Militarily, it stipulates the unification of military and law enforcement functions under the ministries of defense and interior, which report to President Hadi. The agreement also calls for all government offices and services to be unified under the new joint government— a message to the citizens of the south that they are now part of a new united government in which they are in an equal partner.
The Riyadh agreement came at a time when the fabric of a “liberated south,” never a very strong one, was being torn apart by feuding between forces formed and supported by the United Arab Emirates and those hosted and funded by Saudi Arabia. The fighting strongly suggested there were serious disagreements between the two partners in the Arab coalition—
or, more cynically, that there was an agreement to somehow split the south into zones of influence between them. The wording of the agreement and the speeches and memoranda associated with it paid only lip service to the concept of a general peace in Yemen. Both the Hadi government and Saudi officials stated that this agreement aimed at involving the STC in future peace talks “to end the coup perpetrated by the terrorist, Iran-supported Houthi militias,” hardly a signal to the Houthis that this agreement is a prelude to a genuine and comprehensive peace.
An implementation committee, chaired by Saudi Arabia, along with Saudi troops sent to Aden to oversee what may literally be a shotgun marriage between the STC and Hadi, points to a stronger role by the Saudis in the south than it has hitherto played. This may be good news to both Hadi and the STC, since it reaffirms Saudi support to the Hadi government and grants legitimacy to a secessionist movement that has not been granted the right to speak for the south. The flip side of the coin is that the move also reasserts a firm Saudi hand in the south and an ownership of the process of war and peace in Yemen, leaving little room for Yemenis to decide their own future independent of regional influence. At the launch of this initiative, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman labeled the parties as allied against the Houthis and “seeking to reverse the coup” against President Hadi’s government. The ball is, therefore, in Saudi Arabia’s court as to whether the Riyadh Agreement is a step towards peace with the Houthis or the launch of a new phase in the war against them.
Encouraging Signs
Saudis and Houthis have been holding indirect talks in Oman and emissaries have been going back and forth between Riyadh and Houthi leaders. The UAE’s recent statements to the effect that the Houthis are Yemenis and will have a role in Yemen’s future, are encouraging, if late, signs that that both Saudis and Emiratis have had enough of a five-year war that gets more complicated and expensive by the day. The Saudi budget has recently gone into deficit and the Kingdom has been considering selling 5 percent of ARAMCO, its principal oil company, in order to cover some of its costs, including the war in Yemen and the very ambitious development plan known as Vision 2030. Recent U.S. diplomatic activity and statements indicate that Washington, too, may be investing in a new effort to end the war.
The war in Yemen started when the Houthi-led Ansar Allah, taking advantage of a power vacuum in Sanaa, stormed the capital city and drove president Hadi from power. The Saudi-led Arab coalition then launched a war against the Houthis in 2015 to restore Hadi, and their own influence in the country. Five years later, the Houthis are still ensconced in the north, while the south, where the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been dominant over the past five years, remains in chaos. Meanwhile, the Yemeni population is being crushed by famine, disease and poverty. Any rational actor would have to conclude that it is high time to end this war and sue for peace rather than insist on total defeat of the Houthis, something that has proven impossible despite the advantages of technology and Western support enjoyed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
For the Riyadh Agreement to lead to a comprehensive peace it must first be consolidated. This means an effective merger between the STC and the Hadi government and a display of good faith and effective government in the south. Currently, many southerners are not convinced they should stay in the union and may not be convinced the STC genuinely wants to return to it. The benefits of a united Yemen need to be demonstrated by finally bringing stability and prosperity to average citizens across south Yemen. Second, a bold and detailed plan for peace with the north must be agreed on in principle with the Houthis and sold to skeptical populations in the north and south. Such a plan must begin with a general ceasefire and an agreement to lift the siege on Yemeni borders and airports. The Houthis must in turn lift their own siege of Taiz, Yemen’s second largest city and population center. A ceasefire and a reopening of airports are critical, not only to alleviate the pain and suffering of Yemenis but also as a goodwill measure to allay northern fears that the Riyadh Agreement is merely unifying the anti-Houthi coalition in preparation for further prosecution of the war.
After twenty-five years in the Foreign Service, Dr. Nabeel Khoury retired from the U.S. Department of State in 2013 with the rank of Minister Counselor. He taught Middle East and U.S. strategy courses at the National Defense University and Northwestern University. In his last overseas posting, Khoury served as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Yemen (2004 to 2007). In 2003, during the Iraq war, he served as Department spokesperson at U.S. Central Command in Doha and in Baghdad. You can follow Nabeel on Twitter @khoury_nabeel.
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